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 John Gardner has noted that legal positivism is more a theory of legal validity than 
it is a theory about law ’ s nature. 1 This is true in that one can be a legal positivist 
and hold a variety of different theories about law ’ s nature, but not to the extent 
that  ‘ anything goes ’ ontologically speaking. Rather, it seems fairly diffi cult to be a 
legal positivist and not say that the law is a kind of social fact. 
 That being said, however, there are a variety of ways of creating social facts so 
there is some room for disagreement when it comes to the nature of law within 
the wide umbrella of legal positivism. If our focus is legal validity, then we may not 
have too much reason to wade into these deeper metaphysical waters.  However, 
I believe that legal positivism has a challenge that is not (as) present in other 
 theories of law: the problem of explaining law ’ s normativity. I contend that one 
of the best hopes for meeting this challenge is to be found in getting more clarity 
about what it is that yields these special social facts, although I remain open to the 
possibility that the challenge can also be met in other ways. 
 Let us fi rst get a bit more clarity on the challenge itself, then we will see how 
settling the metaphysical questions about law can help to meet the challenge, and 
then I can suggest how my preferred answer to the metaphysical questions meets 
the challenge. 
 I. Hume ’ s Guillotine 
 The challenge is a version of the age-old problem identifi ed perhaps most clearly 
by David Hume: that one cannot reason from a set of merely descriptive factual 
premises to a conclusion that contains a normative claim. 2 If we accept that law is 
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a social fact, then it would seem to be a descriptive fact without a clear normative 
implication. Consider the following argument: 
 P1. Some guys in Washington, DC, back in 1954 wrote a lengthy document some part of 
which contained a clause specifying that citizens and residents of the United States fi le 
and pay their taxes by 15 April of each year. 
 P2. When asked to show their assent to this document, a majority of people in the room 
at the time said  ‘ aye ’ . This happened twice, once on each side of the building. 
 P3. This document was then sent up the street where another guy signed it. 
 ∴ I [as a US citizen] ought to fi le and pay taxes by 15 April of each year. 
 Before we get into the details of this argument and how to tighten it up a bit, we 
should notice one thing about the obvious gap and what Hume was saying. We 
need not conclude that the normative conclusion is incapable of having a truth-
value merely because one is not entitled to draw it from non-normative facts. 
Hume ’ s point was merely that normative conclusions (which might still be true 
or false, unless one accepts a meta-normative theory denying this) are of a dif-
ferent kind from non-normative facts. Hence, one cannot reason from the non-
normative to the normative. There are no  ‘ oughts ’ ,  ‘ shoulds ’ or other analogues in 
the premises, so we cannot soundly offer a conclusion that contains one. 
 The problem we will tackle here is therefore not how to justify a given norma-
tive conclusion from merely descriptive premises about the law, but how we are 
even entitled to expect such a justifi cation. In other words, the problem is what 
makes a robust normative conclusion truth-apt, given an argument that appar-
ently only has descriptive premises. Put another way, we can see Hume ’ s point as 
saying that there is a category mistake in reasoning from merely descriptive prem-
ises to a normative conclusion: even if the normative conclusion can have a truth-
value, the  kind of truth it contains is different than the  kind of truth contained 
in the premises. Hence one cannot reason from descriptive kinds of premises to 
normative kinds of conclusions. So our task is not here to justify that one ought or 
ought not to follow the law. Rather, we are trying to discover how it is even possible 
for such conclusions to be of the right  kind given the apparently merely descrip-
tive premises. To do so we must deny that there is a Humean category mistake in 
such arguments about the law. And to support that denial we must investigate 
the metaphysics of the law to show where normativity creeps into the otherwise 
merely descriptive premises. 
 II. Getting to a Legal  ‘ Ought ’ 
 Now clearly, before we can even begin to examine this argument as an instance 
of legal reasoning, we must get the idea of law into the argument somehow. The 
descriptions in the three premises are non-legal descriptions of events that have 
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legal consequences within a system of law already in place. So a more precise 
option would be to set out the descriptions of prior events that make it the case 
that these events specify a legal outcome. We would have to say that there was a 
foundational document adopted by the original State legislatures, specifying the 
composition and procedures of the bodies on the two sides of that building; that 
the guys saying  ‘ aye ’ on each side of the building were themselves picked out by 
a selection procedure in each State consistent with the foundational documents 
of those States and of the over-arching foundational document adopted by the 
original States; that the guy up the street signing the document was himself picked 
out by a selection procedure specifi ed within that foundational document; that 
the content of the document to which they were saying  ‘ aye ’ was itself consistent 
with the foundational document adopted by the original States, etc. But for ease of 
treatment let us boil all this down and just add a fourth premise: 
 P4. These events constituted a law in the United States. 
 The status of this particular premise is somewhat more opaque, especially as it 
deploys the very concept that we are primarily worried about, LAW. But the point 
of this exercise is to inquire into the propriety of reaching a normative conclusion 
from legal premises, so it will have to be in there somehow. We will also shortly 
see that the question of whether this premise is entirely non-normative is precisely 
what separates legal positivists from the anti-positivists. We might also be wonder-
ing a bit about this  ‘ constituted ’ relation, a point we will return to a bit later. 
 First, however, let us get something more explicitly normative into our argument: 
 P5. Legally, I ought to pay my taxes by 15 April of each year. 
 I say that this is explicitly normative because it uses an  ‘ ought ’ term, but that 
 normativity might be misleading or of the wrong kind to justify the more basic 
conclusion that I ought to pay my taxes by 15 April of each year. Instead, this is a 
contextually bound claim that may or may not have more basic normative conse-
quences. So while there is an  ‘ ought ’ in the statement, it may not get us where we 
need to be. According to legal positivism, a legal requirement is still a matter of 
descriptive fact about the legal system even if it is a conclusion of the social fact 
premises. 
 To be more precise, there is some dispute among legal positivists about whether 
legal normativity is a special context-dependent form of normativity, or if it rep-
resents instead a kind of assertion about our moral obligations. HLA Hart held the 
fi rst view and Joseph Raz holds the second. 3 Under Hart ’ s view, the Humean prob-
lem is avoided by stipulation. That is, instead of the conclusion we are discussing 
here, we simply stick  ‘ legally ’ in front of it, thereby substituting P5 for the conclu-
sion, and our work is done. We are entitled to the new conclusion because, while 
it uses normative terminology, its truth is merely a matter of the descriptive facts 
that came before. What one legally ought to do is entirely exhausted by the social 
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facts that determine the law: if the law says to pay your taxes by 15 April, then that 
is what one legally ought to do. What one ought to do  tout court is simply not at 
issue until we get into a wider theory of political obligation. Law ’ s normativity is 
therefore artifi cial in both senses of the word. 
 While that is certainly one way out of this particular conundrum, I ’ ll follow Raz ’ s 
view because of the interesting problem that it leaves open: how to justify the move 
from mere descriptive facts to a robust normative conclusion. 4 That is, the  ‘ legally ’ 
qualifi er, places the normative claim in a special context such that it becomes a 
descriptive fact about the legal system in question and not a normative claim about 
what I ought to do. So we still need an argument to strip the  ‘ legally ’ qualifi er from 
the normative statement. Under this view we can either see P5 as an additional 
premise on its own, or as a nested conclusion reached from the prior premises but 
still antecedent to the more basic normative claim made in the main conclusion. 
 III. Need for a Metaphysical Answer 
 Anti-positivists such as natural lawyers have another easy way out of the problem. 
Natural law can be understood to add two premises: 
 NLP1. Law is an ordinance of reason. 5 
 NLP2. One should do what the balance of reasons dictates. 
 So we have a normative claim squarely in the premises. If we are comfortable with 
the additional premise that this particular law is not overly defective (in that it 
is not against the balance of reasons), we can get a decent argument for the con-
clusion. But we have to be satisfi ed with the premise that law is an ordinance of 
reason, linking practical reason to the non-defectiveness conditions of law itself. 
That is one metaphysical claim about the nature of law: that it is an ordinance of 
reason. And it is one way to offer a kind of solution to the problem. So in natural 
law we already fi nd a metaphysical solution to the problem, just not one that legal 
positivists are comfortable accepting. If we aren ’ t comfortable with that particular 
metaphysical claim, believing instead perhaps that legality is entirely a creation of 
human beings and therefore exhausted by the social facts described in the original 
premises, then we still have to fi gure out some way of getting from  ‘ it ’ s a law ’ and 
 ‘ legally, I ought to pay ’ to  ‘ I ought to pay ’ . 
 Now it may also be that the argument simply doesn ’ t go through. There are 
certainly circumstances in which I ought not to pay. The question isn ’ t what forces 
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the truth of the conclusion unerringly, but rather what in the premises makes the 
conclusion truth-apt given that the nature of those facts is different in kind than 
the normative claim of the conclusion. The answer is to fi nd normativity lurking 
elsewhere in the premises within the nature of law. That is, in an understanding of 
how those facts constitute law we will see the beginnings of a normative demand. 
 If the goal, as just stated, is to discover what makes the conclusion truth-apt, 
given the premises as originally conceived do not have any obviously normative 
contents, then to reach the goal there would have to be something within those 
contents that hid some aspect of normativity. There would have to be something 
in the nature of the things referred to in the premises that would allow for norma-
tive conclusions to be drawn from facts about them. And here is the fi rst sugges-
tion that the solution must be metaphysical. If we are looking at the nature of the 
things described in the premises for our lurking normativity, we are asking for 
a more complete picture of the ontology of some aspect of what we are talking 
about. In the original premises P1 – P3, the descriptions were fairly straightfor-
ward, although there might be some questions about  ‘ United States ’ ,  ‘ taxes ’ and 
 ‘ assent ’ . But the really opaque part is in P4. We need to have greater clarity of what 
it is for a set of facts such as shown in P1 – P3 to  ‘ constitute a law ’ , as that is most 
likely the source of normativity that makes the original conclusion truth-apt. 
 Let me be clear about something else. In accepting Raz ’ s picture of the nature 
of the normative demand that law makes, one might think that we can just follow 
Raz ’ s picture of authority generally and say that what legitimates the normative 
demand that law makes is whether it provides a better guide to the balance of 
reasons that apply to us than we would be able to discover and/or follow on our 
own. 6 I am not adverse to this idea of authority but I need to make it clear that it is 
not quite the project that we set out on here. Raz has given us an analysis of what 
legitimates authority generally and then shows how that analysis can be applied to 
law. 7 The result is a picture of what conditions law would have to satisfy in order 
for its directives to be legitimate. That might at fi rst blush appear to be a perfectly 
adequate answer to the task of validating the argument set out above. But above 
further investigation, we should see that it is not quite the same argument. Instead, 
we would have given an argument with a conclusion about when we should follow 
a legitimate authority and then perhaps given some premises about when legal 
directives meet those conditions for legitimate authority. 
 Now it very well may be in the end that the only time we really should follow a 
legal directive is when it meets the conditions for legitimate authority. So maybe 
the only argument we should really be concerned with is the one over what legiti-
mates an authoritative directive and how those conditions might be applied to 
law. But for better or worse, the task we have set ourselves above is what about the 
law itself makes a normative conclusion truth-apt, based on merely descriptive 
premises about the law. So the question is then what is it in the nature of the law 
upon
152 Kenneth M Ehrenberg
 8  See Raz (1985: 295, 302). 
that allows us even to entertain the propriety of reasoning from descriptive prem-
ises to a normative conclusion. Raz takes it as given that law  could be legitimately 
authoritative (seeing it as a paradigm instance of authority). 8 Our question here is 
what it is about law that makes it so. 
 Remembering what exercised Hume about the is-ought problem also helps to 
see why the solution must be a metaphysical one. The question is not merely how 
we can know the truth of a normative conclusion where the premises are merely 
descriptive. Rather the question is how a truth of a different, normative, kind 
could be derived from merely descriptive premises. This calls for an investigation 
either into the nature of normativity generally, or (at least) one into the nature of 
the particular descriptive premises that supposedly ground the normative conclu-
sion. So let us now turn to thinking a bit more about the relation between the 
descriptions in P1 – P3 and P4. 
 IV. An Artefact 
 P1 – P3 are descriptions of actions taken by a set of individuals over time. P4 is a 
claim that these actions are to be understood as having created something that 
wasn ’ t in existence before those actions (or to have altered some aspect of what 
was there before). Given that the actions involved writing things down, showing 
assent to what was written, and then adding one ’ s name to the writing (we assume, 
after that person has read it), it does not seem too much of a stretch to say that 
these actions were intentional on the part of those who participated (or at least the 
vast majority of them). 
 Some acts could be either intentional or non-intentional. I can decide to take a 
breath at a certain point in time, making an action that is usually not intentional 
into one that is intentional. It is also certainly true that not all human intentional 
action is necessarily goal-directed. I can intentionally start doodling on a pad of 
paper without having any goal in mind about the picture I am trying to create. 
However, I would also say that the more interactive and collaborative an action is 
with others, the more it would appear necessary for it to be goal-directed. After all, 
if I am hoping that others will participate in the action with me, they will likely 
need reasons to do so. Their reasons might not be the same as mine. Indeed, every-
one might participate with his or her own individual reason for doing so. But to 
say that it is interactive and collaborative is to say that the people participating 
likely share some conception of what it is that they are doing together. So, while 
their motivating reasons might be vastly different from one another, their under-
standing of the enterprise itself is likely to have some unifi ed goal insofar as they 
understand with one another what it is that they are doing together. 
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 Given the descriptions we have in P1 – P3, and the more complex description in 
P4, along with the idea that the people referred to are doing something together, 
it is not unreasonable to say that they are acting together in order to constitute 
the law as described in P4. (And if you do fi nd this to be too much of a jump, I ’ m 
happy to include it as an additional premise — that the participants described in 
P1 – P3 understood what they were doing was creating a law and acted in order 
to do that. After all, that addition is still clearly descriptive.) While to the extent 
that they are working together might suggest that they are merely engaging in 
some group activity (which they certainly are), the idea that their group activ-
ity is constituting something as described in P4 suggests that their activity is not 
merely goal-directed but productive. That is, their activity is changing or creating 
something. 
 Here I will help myself to a taxonomy fi rst articulated (to my knowledge) by 
my former colleague Randall Dipert. Any materials the people in Washington 
used toward their goals could be called  ‘ instruments ’ . Materials that were specially 
adapted to serve their goals would be  ‘ tools ’ , while materials that were specially 
adapted to serve specifi c goals and to communicate that usage would be under-
stood as  ‘ artefacts ’ . 9 (Tools are a subcategory of instruments and artefacts are a 
subcategory of tools.) If I pick up a rock from the ground and use it to smash open 
some nuts, I ’ m using the rock as an instrument. If I bang off some fl akes of the 
rock to give it a smoother surface for better smashing those nuts, I ’ ve made a tool. 
And if I attach to it a handle and perhaps design special ridges specifi cally adapted 
to nut-cracking, then I ’ ve made an artefact. 10 
 Notice that one can recognise an artefact without knowing what precise usage 
it is meant to serve. However, the primary way we try to understand an artefact 
with which we are unfamiliar is by trying to discover what it is (or was) used for. 
 When these guys in Washington wrote something down on paper, polled their 
members for their assent (twice) and then sent the writing up the street for another 
guy to sign, each person was clearly acting with the intent that what they were 
doing would be understood as the creation of something with normative impli-
cations. They  wanted us to pay our taxes by 15 April each year and they thought 
that what they were doing would have the effect (among others) of creating a 
norm that we do so. Hence, what they were doing was creating a kind of tool that 
(they imagined) established a norm that United States residents pay their taxes 
by 15 April each year. But more than merely a tool, what they created also carried 
the  signal to them and others that they thereby created that norm. Hence they 
 created a kind of artefact, one function of which was to establish the norm that US 
 residents pay their taxes by 15 April of each year. 
 However, the fact that they created an artefact with the function of  establishing 
this norm does not entail that the norm was successfully established. It is, of course, 
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entirely possible to create an artefact with a function that cannot be fulfi lled. I can 
create a perpetual motion machine, which will always be doomed to failure. Many 
smart people created machines the function of which was to fl y before the Wright 
brothers fi nally made a successful one. 11 
 Yet, even if the particular norm that they wanted to create wasn ’ t thereby cre-
ated, if they were successful in creating an artefact at all, then some normativity 
is thereby entailed by the fact of artefact creation. Amie Thomasson tells us that 
public artefacts (artefacts that are designed to be recognisable to people other than 
merely the creator) have  ‘ receptive ’ features that signal how the object is to be used 
or treated. 12 It is therefore this signalling feature of such artefacts that introduces 
the barest form of normativity into the otherwise completely descriptive account 
of what is going on. In the case of law, the norm being signalled generally may be 
simply that the norm putatively created by the legislation is being singled out for 
a special kind of social emphasis. 
 Once again, even these barest norms of treatment conveyed by the signalling 
need not be normatively dispositive for action. One can have over-riding reasons 
to ignore the signals conveyed by the artefact. I can use the nut-cracker as a door-
stop, and I can see some laws as a reasons for disobedience rather than reasons for 
compliance. Yet in each of these cases, my mere usage of these artefacts in other 
ways than those they were intended does not mean I stop recognising them as the 
kind of artefacts they are. My nut-cracker remains a nut-cracker, even when used 
as a doorstop. The point was to show where and how normativity can arise within 
the otherwise descriptive claims in the premises of the argument, to show how the 
conclusion can be truth-apt even when based on descriptive premises. 
 This signalling is precisely what opens up the possibility that the normativ-
ity created in making the artefact applies more broadly beyond those who are 
directly involved in its creation. Even theorists who are doubtful that law can cre-
ate new norms beyond merely activating pre-existing conditional norms, such as 
David Enoch, accept that norms can be created through the communication of an 
intention to do so (such as me making a request of you, which communicates my 
intention that you see the request as a reason for complying with it). 13 So if law is 
a public artefact and public artefacts consist (partially) in signalling that they be 
received by others as carrying normativity, then that signalling can be seen as the 
communicated intention to create a norm, at least of recognition. 
 The implication here is that the most basic norm created when the artefact is 
created is that the artefact is one token of a type understood (here) in terms of the 
function the artefact is to perform. This is why the nut-cracker doesn ’ t stop being 
a nut-cracker when used as a doorstop. And I can understand that the point of the 
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behaviour of these guys in Washington is to put some special emphasis on a norm 
to pay taxes by 15 April, even if I never comply. 
 V. An Institution 
 Now, even if you think that this might get us somewhere in the explanation of 
where normativity arises in our otherwise merely descriptive premises, you might 
be somewhat bothered by what appears to be a kind of circularity in this picture 
of the nature of law. That is, the intention communicated by the behaviour of 
the guys in Washington is that I treat the result of their actions as a law — that is 
what is meant by that special social emphasis. The nut-cracker is still a nut-cracker 
even when repurposed; the law is still a law, even when broken. But that means 
these actions creating the artefact, constituting the law, are somehow self-defi ning. 
 Normativity may have been created, but only by allowing the  deus ex machina of 
this bootstrapping self-defi nition. 
 Put another way, there appears to be an important distinction between the law 
and the nut-cracker. To create a nut-cracker, one must merely create an object with 
the purpose and structural ability to crack nuts, and which signals its usability for 
doing so. But to create a law, one follows a set of procedures that earlier people set 
forth for doing so (in more law that was pre-existing or that they created), thereby 
giving the status of law to what one does. The key to the law is its status and that 
status and its implications seem to have been created at some point out of nothing. 
 The answer to this fi nal problem lies in understanding the nature of an 
 institution and how it creates and defi nes a special status. The law isn ’ t just any 
artefact, but rather is a specifi c kind of artefact: an institution. The special task 
of institutions is to create and alter  ‘ desire-independent reasons for action ’ . 14 So 
the truth-aptness of a normative conclusion stemming from merely descriptive 
premises lies in whether those premises are describing the creation of an artefact 
generally, or the activation/creation of an institution specifi cally. 
 As kinds of artefacts, but unlike other social forms like rituals or cultures, 
 institutions are also self-consciously created. As a certain kind of public artefact 
for manipulating norms, institutions are intentionally created social arrangements 
for pursuing certain ends by altering the normative relationship among those who 
are within or subject to the institution. 
 Following John Searle ’ s infl uential theory of institutions, institutional facts are 
social facts about  ‘ status functions ’ that are assigned to objects, people, events, 
practices, etc by a specifi c group adopting a  ‘ constitutive rule ’ . 15 Those statuses are 
it ex nihilo, via
156 Kenneth M Ehrenberg
 16  ibid 91. 
 17  See Searle (1995: 87 – 88). 
 18  ibid 5. 
understood to alter the normative relations among people in order to serve the 
purposes of those creating or using the institution. 
 But the point of introducing institutions to this discussion for our purposes 
here is to try to answer the apparent problem of the self-defi ning nature of law ’ s 
special normative status. While physical artefacts like nut-crackers get their little 
bit of normativity from the intentions their creators have for them to serve and 
signal their particular functions, our guys in Washington are simply writing things 
down, saying  ‘ aye ’ , and signing their names. And that ’ s supposed to put a specifi c 
kind of special status on what they ’ ve done, giving us reasons for action. 
 For this fi nal piece of the puzzle, we must return to where we started at the very 
beginning: legal validity. On the fi rst page I made much of the distinction between 
the metaphysics of law and legal validity, pointing out that legal positivists can 
disagree on the metaphysics of law while agreeing on a theory of legal validity. 
But in order to give a metaphysical explanation of how normativity arises in law, 
I need to show where legal validity arises in my metaphysical picture since legal 
validity determines the contours of the normativity of law. 
 To do this, I am going to help myself to another distinction made by Searle 
in his theory of institutions. Searle distinguishes between informal institutions 
and formal institutions. In the former, the special normative statuses (conveying 
 ‘ deontic powers ’ to participants) are doled out case by case. 16 That is, there are no 
formal rules for determining what counts as an instance of an informal institu-
tion. So those participating in that social arrangement must establish whether they 
are participating in an instance of the arrangement and the special rights, powers 
and responsibilities entailed by it in each case. Cocktail parties are informal insti-
tutions in that each one must be understood as such, token by token. 17 
 In formal institutions, however, the constitutive rule is  ‘ codifi ed ’ , specifying 
what features an instance must have to be counted as one of that type of institu-
tion. 18 This notion of codifi cation is Searle ’ s and is meant to be broader than the 
legal usage. But the idea is that by codifying a constitutive rule for the institution, 
we are giving specifi cations of what instances, actions, roles, enactments, writings, 
etc are normatively valid by the institution ’ s own lights. Codifi cation is a formal-
ised process of declaration for attaching, creating or altering normatively laden 
statuses. 
 Strictly speaking, the formal/informal distinction among institutions isn ’ t 
entirely necessary to solve the self-referentiality problem, but it helps to under-
stand what is going on in arguments about law ’ s normativity. Recall that the self-
referentiality problem arose because an institution defi nes its own statuses. To be 
a nut-cracker is to be designed and manufactured in such a way as to be primarily 
purposed to crack nuts and to signal that usage. To be a cocktail party is to be 
treated as a cocktail party by participants, whatever that treatment might be for 
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them. To be a law is to be created as a law, where the powers conveyed by being 
a law are set forth in further laws that determine which laws count as such. The 
two institutional cases display self-referentiality in that they are constituted by 
statuses that are self-defi ned: To be a cocktail party is to be treated as a cocktail 
party. To be a law is to be created as a law. But in these institutional cases the status 
named by (or of) the institution ( ‘ law ’ ,  ‘ cocktail party ’ ) is merely a  ‘ placeholder 
for the linguistic articulation of all [the] practices ’ that perform the function(s) 
that the status is supposed to accomplish. 19 The self-defi nition of these statuses is 
not a problem precisely because the name of the status is simply standing in for 
the normative alterations that are supposed to be effected by the creation of the 
institution or the application of the institution to a new instance. When it happens 
formally, as it does in legal situations, the processes and normative implications of 
that status are set out in prior formal rules that must be followed for new instances 
to be institutionally recognised. 
 So we now have a more complete picture of how the metaphysics of law answers 
the problem of explaining law ’ s normativity when we understand law to be a spe-
cies of social fact. The mere descriptive facts of what some people do in Washington 
have normative implications because those people are  ‘ offi cials ’ within legal insti-
tutions, their statuses and thus their deontic powers specifi ed and defi ned by those 
institutions. When they act in their offi cial capacities, they are making changes 
to those institutions, which then has normative implications for those subject to 
those institutions. 
 While it will always be a separate question whether people supposedly subject to 
those institutions should pay any attention to how its offi cials claim to alter their 
normative space, what gets them into the zone of danger for such a normative 
change is that institutions are kinds of artefacts (albeit abstract ones). As such they 
are special kinds of tools that signal their functionality to those who interact with 
them. That signalling carries at least the basic normative demand that we recog-
nise the artefact for what it is in terms of what it is supposed to do. In this case, the 
function of the artefact is itself to create and alter norms. 
 There are two kinds of normativity at play here. Seeing law as a kind of artefact 
bundles the most basic kind of normativity into the otherwise descriptive picture. 
That is, a norm formed by the communicated intention of the artefact creator that 
we see the creation as a member of a specifi c kind. In this case, it is merely that we 
recognise what those guys in Washington did in 1954 was to create a law, even if 
we eventually decide not to follow it. We can decide not to use our nut-cracker to 
crack nuts (or even use it as a doorstop), yet we don ’ t stop understanding it to be a 
nutcracker. So even if we decide not to follow the law, we still recognise it as a law 
and that it was supposed to alter our rights and responsibilities. This is what makes 
it possible to draw normative conclusions from otherwise descriptive premises. 
The communicated intention of the artefact creator is a normative demand bun-
dled with those premises. 
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 The other kind of normativity is the particular demands of the law itself, under-
stood as an instance of a formal institution. Within the institutional ambit, those 
norms are binding insofar as they are valid. Whether those norms are robustly 
binding in a wider sense depends on whether those addressed by the norms have 
good reasons to be bound by the institution and what it is doing. That is the par-
ticular question of whether one should follow that law and depends for its answer 
on whatever justifi es the law ’ s authority on that point. 
 So what we add with P4, that the actions undertaken by those guys in 
Washington constituted a law, is a norm that we recognise what they did as law and 
as  potentially having normative implications for everyone described within the 
ambit of that institution. This doesn ’ t entitle us to say that the argument is valid 
in that the conclusion could still be false even when the premises are true. But it 
does explain why that normative conclusion could possibly be true even though 
the premises are otherwise merely descriptive. 
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